Disability insurance take-up has expanded substantially in the past twenty years in the United States while shrinking in Canada. We empirically assess these trends by measuring the strength of the 'push' from weak labor markets versus the 'pull' of more generous benefits. Using an instrumental variables strategy comparing benefit changes across country, age, and year, we find that both benefits and regional wages matter. Simulations suggest that the upswing in disability insurance take-up in the United States would be reversed, dropping the caseload by one quarter, if benefits and wages had followed the growth path observed in Canada.
Introduction
The emerging debate about the economic and social withdrawal of prime-age workers encompasses several possible contributing factors, ranging from trade, to technology, to policy. 1 Public disability insurance is often raised in this context in the United States. Using administrative data sources, we graph in Figure 1 the incidence of disability insurance benefits in Canada and the United States, separately for men and women over ages 30-59 from 1970 30-59 from to 2015 30-59 from . Since about 1990 in the United States, the disability insurance takeup rate for men has nearly doubled while for women it has more than tripled. In Canada, disability insurance uptake rose through 1995, and then fell back slightly for men, while leveling out for women.
The contrasts across the two countries are striking, and reveal an opportunity to explore the causes of the observed disability insurance trends. In particular, two leading explanations in the US literature can be assessed by comparing the US to Canada. First, the decline of mid-skill employment opportunities might 'push' workers onto disability insurance. While Canada has not been immune to labor market pressures on lower-skilled workers, the resource boom of the 2000s had a much larger impact on these workers in some regions of Canada. Second, benefit generosity might 'pull' workers into disability insurance receipt. In the United States, benefit generosity has increased over the last twenty years, while declining in Canada.
This paper aims to assess the role of the 'push' and 'pull' factors on disability insurance uptake in the United States and Canada. We use large-scale microdata surveys of labor market activity over the period 1995 to 2015 and a quasiexperimental research design that exploits both policy differences and international wage trends. We find that both push and pull factors matter significantly in explaining the uptake of disability insurance benefits. The differing trends in regional labor markets and benefit generosity can explain almost all of the upswing in disability insurance participation in the United States-if wages and benefits had followed Canadian patterns, disability insurance uptake would be about 24 percent lower than currently observed.
Previous evidence strongly suggests that both the stringency with which fitness to work is assessed and also the generosity of benefits has some influence on labor force withdrawal. 2 In the US, Autor and Duggan (2003) found reduced screening stringency, declining demand for less skilled labor, and increases in replacement rates from disability insurance increased the likelihood of high school dropouts to exit the labor force. Duggan and Imberman (2009) have found that eligibility changes, economic conditions and increased replacement rates were important factors in the growth of SSDI growth among men, while increased coverage because of higher employment was important among women. Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2013) have found benefit receipt by those on the margin of disability benefit entry substantially reduces employment. Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2015) show that disability insurance claims tend to rise in times of high unemployment (although many applications induced by the Great Recessions were denied). In Canada, the evidence is more mixed. Gruber (2000) examines benefit generosity in Quebec relative to the rest of Canada prior to 1987 and finds a large increase in nonparticipation in response to higher benefits. Campolieti (2004) , however, examines an earlier increase in Quebec's benefit generosity (in 1973) and finds no such relationship. Campolieti and Riddell (2012) examine earnings exemptions and found these have an effect on the likelihood of disabled beneficiaries to work, but do not affect flows on or off disability rolls.
We begin with a description of the disability insurance programs in Canada and the United States. Following that, we explore the differences in disability insurance uptake across subgroups of education, gender, and age across the two countries. We then proceed to describe our empirical strategy and present our main empirical results. Finally, we simulate counterfactual paths for both earnings and benefits to observe the impact on disability insurance uptake trends.
Disability Insurance Programs and Earnings
Disability insurance arose as part of the social insurance structure of industrialized countries from a desire to provide income support to those unable to work because of poor health. Typically, these plans are contributory with benefits geared to some function of lifetime earnings. The Canadian and American public disability insurance plans conform to this international pattern in general, but there are subtle differences in how the programs are implemented. We set out key details of the Canadian and American public disability plans in this section, with an emphasis on plan details after 1995. Further details can be found in Baker and Milligan (2012) Milligan and Schirle (2016), Milligan (2012) , Coile (2016) and Campolieti and Riddell (2012) .
Canada / Quebec Pension Plan Disability Insurance
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) was introduced in 1966, with a retirement and a disability insurance component (referred to as CPP-D). Workers began making contributions in 1967 and disability benefits began in 1970. Quebec administers its own disability insurance program as part of the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). Since the late 1980s, the two disability insurance programs have been nearly identical in terms of their benefit formulas, with some small differences in eligibility criteria.
The disability benefit has two components. The first component offers a flat-rate benefit that is indexed to the consumer price index. In 2015, the flat rate portion To determine average earnings (the second component of the disability benefit), one begins by establishing the relevant contribution period, which is the time since the individual turned 18 or 1967 (whichever is later). To update nominal earnings in the contribution period, earnings are multiplied by a ratio of a five-year average of the earnings cap to each year's earnings cap. This earnings cap, known as the year's maximum pensionable earnings or YMPE, was CAD$53,600 in 2015 and is indexed annually to a measure of average wages. Until 1997, a three-year average of the earnings cap was used to update earnings. This was adjusted to a four-year average in 1998 and then the five-year average in 1999. Individuals may drop years from the contribution period associated with care of their young children. Some low-earnings years are then dropped for individuals with at least 10 years in their contribution period. Until 2011, 15% of months were dropped. This increased to 16% for 2012-13 and 17% for 2014-15. The remaining contribution period is used to obtain an average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). An individual's benefit from CPP-D and QPP-D can be summarized as Disability Benefit = Flat rate + 0.1875 * AIME + child benefits For the CPP-D, eligibility for the benefit requires that an individual has a disability that is both "severe and prolonged". 3 Severe implies the disability regularly stops the individual from doing any type of substantially gainful work. Since 1995, the medical adjudication process does not account for socio-economic factors in assessing disability. The QPP-D also has a medical adjudication process, but appears to allow greater flexibility in the process.
Eligibility also depends on labor force attachment. Until 1996, individuals had to contribute to CPP in two of the previous three or five of the previous ten years to qualify. In 1997, eligibility was restricted to those with contributions in four of the last six years. In 2005, this requirement was loosened a bit, allowing those with 25 years of contributions to CPP and contributions in three of the last six years to be eligible. In Quebec (since 1993), individuals are eligible if they made contributions in two of the previous three or five of the previous ten years.
Social Security Disability Insurance
Social Security provisions for disability insurance (SSDI) were introduced in 1950, with major reforms enacted in the 1970s. The main disability benefit formula has not changed substantially since and primarily depends on an individual's average covered earnings.
To determine average earnings, covered nominal earnings in the individual's earnings history (up to the annual maximum taxable earnings, or AMTE, which was US$118,500 in 2015) are multiplied by the ratio of average wages two years prior the claim (or age 60, whichever is earlier) to past average wages. 4 More recent wages are not adjusted. Individuals can drop out up to 20% (maximum 5 years) of low earnings years from their history. The remaining period (at least two years) is used to obtain their average indexed monthly earnings (AIME).
This average then enters a progressive non-linear benefits formula, summarized as Disability Benefit = 0.9*min(AIME, BEND1) + 0.32*max(min(AIME-BEND1, BEND2-BEND1),0) + 0.15*max(AIME-BEND2,0) BEND1 and BEND2 are "bend points" in the benefit formula. In 2015, the first bend point was set at US$826 per month and the second was set at US$4,980. These bend points are indexed to average wages.
Eligibility for the SSDI benefit requires a person's disability prevent them from doing work they did before, and are unable to adjust to other work because of the medical condition. Furthermore, the disability is expected to last for at least one year or result in death. Consideration is given to socioeconomic factors, including age, education, past work experience, and transferable skills in determining ability to adjust to other work.
Eligibility also depends on previous labor force attachment. Requirements depend on the age at the time of making a claim, but generally need to have worked in 5 of the previous 10 years.
Small Differences That Matter -Benefits and Earnings
One of the key differences between CPP-D and SSDI since 1995 is the adjudication of claims. In Canada, since 1995, eligibility is primarily based on a medical assessment.
While a disability must prevent one from working to be eligible for CPP-D, little consideration is otherwise given to socioeconomic factors after 1995. The downturn in CPP-D benefit receipt after 1995 is often attributed to the 1995 reform in the medical adjudication process. In the United States, explicit consideration is given to one's socio-economic status.
The main difference between the CPP-D and SSDI lies in their benefit formulas.
While the CPP-D formula is a simple linear function of earnings, the SSDI formula is progressively non-linear. Furthermore, SSDI covers a much higher level of earnings than does CPP-D. Since 1995, however, the general structure of the benefit formulas has not changed substantially in either country.
In both the CPP-D and SSDI formulas, key parameters are automatically adjusted, and are indexed to a measure of average wages. It is important to consider, then, that real average wages have trended quite differently in each country. Because average wages affect the benefit formula mechanically, the differential trends in average wages have a mechanical impact on benefit formulas.
In Figure 2a and 2b (Canada), the dashed line represents movements in the 3-5-year average YMPE that is used in the adjustment of earnings histories (indexed here in the graph to 1995=100). We see that the real value of the YMPE was falling slightly through most of the 2000s, nearly recovering to its 1995 levels by 2011. This trend in YMPE largely reflects a period of low wage inflation, relative to price inflation, in the early 2000s. As the flat rate portion of the disability benefit moves with the price index, the lack of movement in the real value of the YMPE will translate into a lack of movement in the real value of disability benefits.
In Figure 2c and 2d (United States), the dashed line represents movements in the first bend point in the benefit formula. This moves at the same rate as the average wage measure used to adjust earnings histories and the second bend point of the formula. In the United States, we see that average wages rose substantially, by more than 20% over the 1995-2015 period. The real value of disability benefits, then, would also be increasing. What does this imply for disability benefits? As bend points are increased faster than a typical worker's earnings, the replacement rates offered by SSDI will increase. This type of increase in replacement rates is not possible in Canada, given the linear nature of the formula. 5 The impact of these parameter changes can be seen by graphing the benefits by age for three different years in Canada (CPP-D in Figure 3a ) and the United States (SSDI in Figure 3b ). For these graphs, we use a common earnings history adjusted only by inflation, and apply the rules applicable in every year.
For Canada at most ages, the highest benefits are in 1995 as seen in Figure 
Trends in DI take-up
The trends in DI take-up for men and women were shown to be very different across Canada and the United States in Figure 1 discussed in the introduction. In this section, we dig into the trends more deeply, looking at differences by age and education in order to better motivate and provide context for our empirical investigation. Figure 4 traces the proportion of the population in different age groups that is a recipient of CPP-D in Canada, separately for women and for men. The same general trends revealed in Figure 1 also manifest in this graph by age group, with strong cohort eligibility effects evident for women. For both men and women, the rate increases sharply with age, with a stronger age gradient for men than for women.
The United States is graphed in Figure 5 , showing by age and gender the take-up rate of SSDI benefits. The top age group here shows the rate from age 60 to the full retirement age (FRA), which has grown slightly through time. The other ages are the same as for Canada. The level of SSDI uptake is higher in Canada, but the age gradient is not as strong as in Canada. For example, in the United States, the take-up rate for men approximately doubles between ages 40-49 and 50-59, then again for the top age group. In contrast, the Canadian men show much larger increases between these age groups.
We now turn to education, which is of interest as a proxy for lifetime earnings potential. The movement of bend points in SSDI and earnings in Figure 2 for the United States suggests that some education groups saw more deterioration of earnings over our time period of interest compared to others. So, the attractiveness of SSDI benefits should differ by education groups. Because the administrative tables we used for the previous take-up graphs do not include education, we turn to our microdata for this analysis. While sample sizes are large, there is some sampling variation introduced by this choice, which is evident on these graphs compared to the relatively smooth administrative data charts shown earlier. The US data come from the Current Population Survey and the Canadian data from the Survey of Labour and income Dynamics. Both of these data sources are described in detail below. In order to highlight the changes by education category, we set each group equal to an index level of 100 in 1995.
Panels A and B of Table 6 show women and men in Canada; panels C and D show the same for the US. There is little strong pattern to be seen, except for very large growth for high-school educated women in Canada. For the United States there is much stronger growth for those with High School and Some College than for those with a BA or more or less than High School. The strongest contrast is for men in panel D. Here, the take-up of SSDI grew by about 60 percent from1995 to 2015 for everyone with a high school diploma or more; but was relatively flat for those with less than high school.
Overall, this analysis has exposed strongly different trends in disability insurance uptake in Canada and the US. Moreover, there are important differences across sex, education group, and age. We take this information as context for the formation of our empirical strategy in the next section where we exploit differences across these groups.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy is quasi-experimental, exploiting variation in policy and international (Canada-US) earnings trends. At the core of our strategy is a differencing framework, within which we use instrumental variables to improve our estimates. We lay out our methods in this section, starting with the estimating equation of interest, then our measurement of disability insurance benefits and moving on to the regional earnings measure.
Estimating Equation
With respect to individual behavior, we think of individuals comparing the utility associated with taking up disability insurance against the utility associated with not taking up disability insurance and continuing to work in the labor force (which we term DI*). The individual's decision will depend primarily on the replacement rate offered by the disability insurance program, which is comprised of two parts -the disability benefit offered (lnDB) and their potential earnings in the local labor market (lnEarn). The individual's decision to take up disability insurance can be described by the equation * = 0 + 1 + 2 +
We estimate the equation using a linear probability model. 
Disability Insurance Benefits
The disability insurance benefits for which one is eligible depends on one's earnings history, the benefit formula in a given year, and current age. The earnings history matters because benefits are calculated explicitly accounting for the pattern of earnings over one's lifetime. The benefit formula matters because it translates the earnings history into a benefit. The age matters because younger people have a smaller number of potential years in work, requiring them to keep more lowerearning years in their earning history, and thus receive a smaller benefit through the application of the formula, given the earnings history.
Calculating the benefit as a function of one's own earnings history introduces potential endogeneity to the benefit calculation. Those who may have a latent disability may have a weaker earnings history, leading to a smaller potential benefit and also a higher likelihood of receiving benefits. To overcome this potential endogeneity problem, we calculate a simulated benefit using a common earnings history for all people. This simulated benefit varies only by three exogenous factors-the system (Canada or the US), the year, and the age. We use this simulated benefit as an instrument to predict the calculated individual benefit.
In our empirical implementation, we control directly for each of these three factors along with the two-way interactions of each of these three factors.
Regional Earnings
The second key variable we wish to relate to disability insurance uptake is the potential earnings on offer to workers. We measure potential earnings as the average earnings within cells defined by age group, education, gender, region and year. Potential earnings, however, reflect supply conditions such as human capital, experience, and other attributes, which may not be observable. If these supply-side attributes are correlated with factors that also influence disability insurance uptake, we need a way to isolate variation in earnings from these other endogenous factors.
For this reason, we implement an instrumental variables strategy, which depends on national earnings trends and fixed local characteristics. This 'Bartik-style instrument' strategy is commonly used in this circumstance. 
Identification
Of note, we include in our estimating equation the main effects for each of our two instrumental variable strategies. For the simulated disability benefit, we have the main effects for year, age, and country. For the Bartik instrument, we have the main effects for gender, age, education, and year. This allows us to identify the effects of benefits and regional earnings using variation across these factors. That is, by including these main effects we can separate the impact of benefits and earnings from the factors used as inputs for the calculation of the instruments.
In order to fortify our empirical strategy, we go beyond this specification by also including the second-order interactions between the three factors for each of our instruments. In this way, our strategy is best thought of as a triple-differencing approach. Specifically, for the disability insurance benefits we include the full set of interactions between age and year, year and country, and age and country. For the regional earnings, we include the full set of interactions between gender and education, education and year, and gender and year. Earlier, Figure 3 showed the extent of our policy variation across years for a given age and country. It is this variation that allows us to implement our triple-difference strategy.
Data
We use pooled cross sections of the U.S. Current Population Survey's (CPS) March Supplements (1995 Supplements ( -2015 and Canada's Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) public use files (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . 7 Each of the surveys provide basic demographic information (age, education, region of residence) and some income information.
Our main sample includes individuals aged 25-59.
For all years in Canada and the US, we can observe in the data receipt of benefits from Social Security (for the US) and Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (for Canada).
This forms our primary dependent variable for the analysis. One important shortcoming of this variable is that it does not distinguish between disability benefits, retirement benefits, and survivor benefits. Our age selection criterion has an upper limit at age 59, which rules out retirement benefits as a possibility in either Canada or the United States. Survivor benefits could be payable to those with a deceased spouse, even if the survivor is under age 60.
Our US data from 2001 forward reports SSDI separately, so we can assess the importance of using the more general SS variable. For men, about 82 percent of benefits in the age range in our data are disability insurance; for women it is about 69 percent. In our results below, we also try specifications for the US using the SSDI receipt indicator.
We make use of regional variation in our data. For Canada, we use the five regions delineated by Statistics Canada. 8 For the United States, we use the nine census divisions. 9 In the rest of this paper we refer to all of these fourteen areas as 'regions'.
Our main independent variables of interest are the projected disability insurance benefits and potential earnings. We form the disability insurance variable by attaching to each observation an earnings history based on the average earnings of someone of that gender, region, education, and year of birth cohort. 10 Using this earnings history, we use a benefit calculator that incorporates the rules as they exist in each year. For potential earnings, we take the average earnings by age group, year, gender, region, and education group.
We control for the demographic characteristics of each individual using available data. These controls include a dummy for marital/common law status, for gender, and a set of four dummy variables for education. 11 We form age group dummies by five-year age clusters, ranging from 25-29 to 55-59.
The final data we bring to the regression are mortality rates. We draw these data from the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org). These data are available separately for Canada and the US by age and gender for each year.
We present descriptive statistics on our sample in Table 1 for several samples and a selection of our variables. Our full sample, pooling together the CPS and the SLID, comes to 2.36 million observations. There are slightly more women than men, and observations from Canada make up one quarter of our sample.
In our full sample, 3.6 percent are receiving disability insurance benefits. The rate of receipt is slightly higher for women, and one third higher in the United States than in Canada. There is a strong education gradient, with 7.0 percent of those with less than high school receiving disability insurance, compared to 1.4 percent of those with a college or university degree.
Our regional earnings variable aims to measure the potential earnings available to a worker in a given region, year, education, gender and age category. Average earnings is higher for males over females, the US over Canada, and follows the expected positive education gradient.
The projected benefits variable contains the result given by our benefit calculators given an earnings history depending on year of birth, education, gender, and region.
The average benefits are higher for males and for those with more education, reflecting higher lifetime earnings paths for these groups. Benefits in the United
States are 73 percent larger than those in Canada. This is a substantial and important difference.
Results and simulations
Our regression results are presented in three tables, showing how our result varies in different specifications and samples. Following that, we present the results of some simulations, which help to explore the implications of the magnitudes of our estimates.
The first results are in or Canada/Quebec Pension Plan benefits. Our first regression in column (1) has an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that includes our two main variables of interest along with a full set of controls-including the 2 nd order interactions as described above. The resulting coefficients for both the log of regional earnings and the log of disability insurance benefits are small and statistically insignificant. The other control variables show sensible results, with lower rates of disability insurance uptake for those who are married and more highly educated.
The second column shows the results of implementing our instrumental variables strategy. Here, we instrument for regional earnings using the Bartik-style composite earnings variable, and for disability insurance benefits using the simulations based on a common earnings history. The results for both the regional earnings and disability insurance benefits now show the expected signs and are strongly significant. The higher are potential regional earnings, the lower is the receipt of benefits, with a 10 percent increase in earnings predicted to lead to a 0.68 percentage point drop in take-up. The positive 0.049 coefficient for disability insurance benefits suggests that a 10 percent increase in the value of disability insurance benefits would lead to about a half point increase in the take-up rate.
The last two columns of Table 2 show the results of the first stage regressions in our instrumental variables implementation. Our Bartik-style composite earnings measure, which exploits national variation in earnings across industrial sectors, is a strong predictor of our regional earnings measure with a coefficient of 0.550. For our simulated benefit derived from a common earnings history, we obtain a coefficient of 1.059, suggesting a strong relationship between the simulated instrument and the actual benefits for someone in that region, gender, education, age, and year category.
We display the first stage relationships in Figure 7 by collapsing the data to the region-year level. The top panel shows the relationship between the Bartik composite earnings and observed regional earnings. There is a clear and strong relationship evident. The bottom panel depicts the simulated benefits and actual disability insurance benefits. Again, there is a clear and strong relationship. In this graph, the cluster at the bottom left are the data points for Canada, where benefit generosity is markedly lower.
The next set of results in Table 3 , showing how our results vary across Canada and the United States separately. We also show results combing both the regional earnings and benefits variables into a replacement rate. The first column of Table 3 replicates our main result from column (2) of Table 2 . In the replacement rate specification, the coefficient of 0.147 implies that a ten-point increase in the replacement rate would increase disability insurance uptake by 1.47 percentage points.
The next two columns of Table 3 show separately our results from our Canadian and US samples. In these specifications, we leave out our 2 nd order interactions because we are looking at each side of our Canada-US differencing strategy separately. The coefficients for Canada are insignificant, while for the United States they are similar in magnitude to the main specification. This does not mean that the Canadian disability insurance program has no impact; it may be that there is not enough variation in Canada alone across age groups and years to identify an impact.
The last column shows the results using a different dependent variable: the receipt of SSDI rather than the more general Social Security benefit receipt we use in the other specifications. Here, the coefficients are quite similar to those in column (3),
suggesting that the inclusion of survivor benefits as part of our dependent variable does not materially affect our results.
The next table explores the results in subsamples defined by gender and education.
Again we present the results for the two main variables separately in the top half of Table 4 , and then combined into a replacement rate in the bottom half of the table.
The response by men overall seems stronger than for women as indicated by the replacement rate coefficients of 0.182 and 0.080. However, the coefficient for regional earnings (the 'push' factor) is much stronger for males while the coefficient for disability insurance benefits (the 'pull' factor) is stronger for females.
Looking across education groups in Table 4 , the response as indicated in the replacement rate specification appears to be monotonically decreasing in education.
For the lowest education group, both regional earnings and benefits matter, while for those with a high school diploma or some post-high school education are much more sensitive to the potential disability insurance benefits than regional earnings.
Simulations
In order to gauge the magnitude of our results, we present some counterfactual simulations based on our main specification in Table 2 , column (2). To form the counterfactual, we take the initial 1995 values for benefits and regional earnings and impose the growth rates for these variables coming from a different region or country. This allows us to illustrate the impact of the push and pull factors on disability insurance uptake according to our estimates.
The simulations appear in Figure 8 . In the top panel, we take the baseline SSDI uptake in the CPS for the United States. We then impose a counterfactual path for earnings in all regions, using the earnings growth rate from Canada. This shortdashed line is above the baseline until 2007, reflecting slower earnings growth in Canada than the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Lower earnings pushes up the SSDI takeup rate. In the later years, the higher earnings growth in Canada pulls the predicted SSDI participation rate under the baseline. We then impose that benefits follow the growth rate for Canadian benefits, instead of the actual path which had benefits growing substantially. We graph this with the long dash, and the effect is dramatic-the time path for SSDI uptake is now slightly downward at some contrast to the upward trajectory in the baseline. By 2011, the gap is approximately one percentage point, which is about one quarter of the 2011 level.
We move from countries to regions in the bottom panel of Figure 8 . Here, we impose the wage growth and benefit growth of the Midwest Census region of the United
States onto the Prairie region of Canada. The Midwest is a region with high disability insurance growth rates and stagnated earnings over this time period; the Prairies in contrast had the strongest earnings growth and the disability insurance takeup rate declined. The bottom panel of Figure 8 shows that again the up and down of wage growth does have some impact relative to the baseline, but it is the change in benefit generosity that has the most substantial impact. By the last year of the simulation in 2011, CPP-D participation is predicted to be 3 percentage points higher in the Prairie region of Canada if they had experienced the same wage growth and benefit growth as the Midwest region of the United States.
These simulations provide two strong conclusions. First, the magnitude of our estimated coefficients for regional earnings and benefit generosity is sufficient to completely explain the trend differences between Canada and the United States in disability insurance uptake. Second, of these two factors, the pull of higher benefits seems to be more quantitatively important than the push of weak labor markets in explaining the trend in disability insurance take-up.
Conclusions
In this paper we explore the pull of benefit generosity and the push of regional labor market conditions on the take-up of disability insurance benefits in Canada and the United States. While disability insurance uptake has grown remarkably over the last twenty years in the United States, it has shrunk in Canada. Using an instrumental variables strategy exploiting policy variation and international earnings growth trends, we find that both push and pull factors matter and can substantially explain the trend differences in disability insurance take-up rates in Canada and the US. If the US had experienced Canadian earnings growth and benefit generosity changes between 1995 and 2015, SSDI take-up would fall by about one quarter from observed levels.
While disability insurance is only one factor in the greater puzzle of labor force withdrawal by middle-skill middle-age workers, our results here suggest may play some role. Future research could look more deeply into the labor supply impact of the rise in disability insurance uptake in the United States, possibly using administrative data sources which more closely follow transitions in and out of the labor force. 
